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STATE OF UTAH
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Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16350

-vsRALPH WYNFIELD FORSHEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION IN THE TlURD
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LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, .FOR THE
CRIME OF UNLAWFUL DIS~RIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTAUCE, THE HONORABLE. JAMES"
S. SAWAYA, JUDGE, PRESIDING
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Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH I
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16350

-vsRALPH IVYNFIELD FORSHEE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant appeals from a jury verdict finding
him guilty of Unlawful Distribution for Value of a Controlled
Substance as proscribed by Utah Code Ann.

§

58-37-8 (1953), as

amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried by a jury on February 7,
1979, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

The trial was presided over by

the Honorable James S. Sawaya.

The jury found appellant

guilty of Unlawful Distribution of a Controlled Substance
contrary to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
as amended.

§

58-37-8 (1953)

Pursuant to the verdict of che jury, Judge

Saway~
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sentenced appellant to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment and
sentence of the court below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 21, 1978, a Deputy Sheriff of the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Department, while working as an
undercover agent, met a confidential informant in order to
meet a third person to purchase narcotics (T.l2-13).
confidential informant

The

took the deputy to a duplex near

3100 South 3450 West in Salt Lake County and the two walked
into the residence (T.l4).

Once inside, the informant

introduced the deputy to appellant and Mrs. Forshee,
appellant's ex-wife (T.l4).

In court, Deputy Whittaker

identified the appellant and Mrs. Forshee as the persons
whom he met that evening (T.l4-15).

Mrs. Forshee then

pointed to a baggie on the kitchen table which Deputy
Whittaker testified appeared to be marijuana (T.l6).
Deputy Whittaker and the appellant, after discussing
briefly the quanitity and quality of the contents of the
baggie, agreed to make the sale for fifty dollars (T.l7).
The deputy paid appellant, took the baggie, and left the
residence (T.l7).

The confidential informant did not
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leave with the deputy, and Deputy Whittaker testified that
the informant lived at the residence in which the transaction took place (T.l8).
Approximately one hour after the transaction,
Deputy lvhittaker met Deputy Randall Anderson in the Valley
Fair Mall parking lot and transferred to Deputy Anderson the
baggie of marijuana (T.lB-19,40-41).

Deputy Anderson

delivered the marijuana to Joseph Tyree, a toxicologist for
the Salt Lake City-County Health Department (T.41,43).
Joseph Tyree, after conducting two tests on the contents
of the baggie, concluded that the substance was marijuana
(T. 48).
Deputy Whittaker was instructed not to disclose
the name of the confidential informant at the trial (T.l3).
Appellant moved before trial to dismiss the information
based upon the state's failure to disclose the name of the
confidential informant as requested in a bill of particulars.
This motion was denied (T.S) since the name of the confidential
informant would be irrelevant if appellant actually made the
sale to the officer.
Appellant's defense presented at trial consisted
of his own testimony, the testimony of his ex-wife, Vickie
Forshee, and that of his new girlfriend, Val Densley.
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Appellant testified that at the time of the alleged
transaction, his ex-wife was living with a Richard Garrett,
whom appellant and his trial counsel believed to be the
confidential informant (T.53,R.27).

Since Richard Garrett

is no longer working as an undercover informant for the
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department, the state can now
disclose that he was the confidential informant involved

in the transaction at issue in this case.
Appellant testified that the transaction had
not taken place, and that the first time he had seen
Deputy Whittaker was at appellant's preliminary hearing
(T.54).

The essence of appellant's story was that Richard

Garrett and Deputy Whittaker must have fabricated the
charge against appellant (T.56).

Appellant admitted on

cross-examination that he had previously been convicted
on a marijuana charge (T.60).
Appellant's ex-wife also testified that she
had never seen Deputy Whittaker before the preliminary
hearing for appellant (T.64).

She also established that

Richard Garrett had been living with her at the time, that
Garrett hated appellant, and that Garrett was

capa~le

of

setting appellant up to commit the crime (T.63,66,67).
Finally, appellant's girlfriend testified that she had
accompanied appellant every time appellant went to see
his children at the residence occupied by appellant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ex-wife and Richard Garrett and had never seen Deputy
Whittaker before (T.72).

The jury discredited the

testimony of the defense witnesses and returned a verdict
of guilty against appellant (T.9l).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO
COMPEL DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY
OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Appellant's sole assignment of error is that
the trial court refused to compel the state to disclose
to appellant the identity of the confidential informant
who arranged the transaction between Deputy Whittaker and
appellant.

Appellant requested such information in a

Motion for Bill of Particulars (R.9-l0).

The state refused

to supply the identity of the informant because, first, the
informant was still being used in undercover narcotics
investigations and disclosure might prejudice those
investigations, and, second, the informant was not a
participant in the transaction between appellant and
Deputy Whittaker (R.l0-12).

Appellant now avers that

under the rule established by the United States Supreme
Court in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), and
under Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, it was error
for the trial court not to compel disclosure of the identity
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of the informant as an exception to the government's
informer privilege.
In Roviaro, supra, the defendant was convicted
of knowingly possessing and transporting unlawfully imported
heroin.

The defendant demanded disclosure of the identity

of a confidential informant who allegedly bought

heroin

from the defendant and was the only other witness to the
alleged transaction.

The government invoked its informer's

privilege and the trial court sustained the failure to
disclose.

The Supreme Court recognized the purpose of the

privilege:
The purpose of the privilege is the
furtherance and protection of the public
interest in law enforcement.
The privilege
recognizes the obligation of citizens to
communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law enforcement officials,
and by preserving their anonymity, encourages
them to perform that obligation.
353

u.s.

53,

59.

The court identified three exceptions to the
privilege of non-disclosure as:
1)
The contents of communications
between the informant and others are not
privileged;
2)
Once the identity of the informant
"has been disclosed to those who would have
cause to resent the communication, the
privilege is no longer applicable;" Roviaro,
supra at p. 60, and
3)
"Where the disclosure of an
informer's identity, or of the contents
of his communication, is relevant and
helpful to the defense of an accused, or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is essential to a fair determination
of a cause, the privilege must give way."
Roviaro, supra at pp. 60-61.
In rejecting any fixed rule when nondisclosure
is erroneous, the Court stated:
The problem is one that calls for
balancing the public interest in protecting
the free flow of information against the
individual's right to prepare his defense.
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure
erroneous must depend on the particular
circumstances of each case, taking into
consideration the crine charged, the
possible defenses, the possible significance
of the informer's testimony, and other
relevant factors.
353 U.S. 53, 62.

The court emphasized the third exception

to the privilege in holding that under the facts of
Roviaro, the failure to require disclosure was error:
This is a case where the Government's
informer was the sole participant, other
than the accused, in the transaction charged.
The informer was the only witness in a
position to amplify or contradict the testimony
of government witnesses. . . We conclude that,
under the circumstances, the trial court
committed prejudicial error in permitting the
Government to withhold the identity of its
undercover employee • . .
353

u.s.

53, 64-65.
The case at bar is factually distinguished from

Roviaro in that here the transaction in which the marijuana
was exchanged took place between Deputy Whittaker and the
appellant, not between the informant and the appellant.

In

addition, the informant here was not the sole witness,
besides appellant, to the transaction.

Appellant's ex-wife,
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Vickie Forshee, was also present and testified at trial
to bolster appellant's defense.

Thus, Roviaro does not

determine the issues in this case.
Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
recognizes the privilege to withhold disclosure of a
confidential informant's identity, subject only to two
exceptions:

(a) where the identity of the informant has

been "otherwise disclosed," and (b) where disclosure is
essential to assure a fair determination of the issues.
These exceptions are two of those recognized in Roviaro,
supra.
As to the first exception ((a) above), the
language of Roviaro shows that the disclosure referred to
goes beyond mere knowledge of the appellant or his counsel
of the identity of the informer.

The Supreme Court stated:

[o]nce the identity of the
informer has been disclosed to those who
would have cause to resent the communication,
the privilege is no longer applicable.
353 U.S.

53, 60 (emphasis added).

In the case at bar, the

class of persons who would resent communication by the
confidential informant includes those who are the subject
of investigations in which the informant may participate.
Such broad disclosure was not made in this case.

In fact,

the state did not "disclose" the identity of the informant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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even to the appellant.

Appellant merely alleges that he

felt Richard Garrett was the informant, and since his
identity was known, disclosure should have been made
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12).

This allegation fails to

recognize that the state's purpose in invoking the
privilege was to protect the confidentiality of the
informant as to other persons under investigation, not
as to the appellant.

Thus, this exception does not apply

to the instant case.
Most of the cases decided after Roviaro have
focused upon exception (b) in Rule 36, relating to
situations where disclosure is relevant and helpful to the
accused's defense or is necessary for a fair determination
of the issues.

The courts have uniformly recognized:

An appellant seeking to overcome the
state's policy of protecting an informant's
identity, has the burden of proving that the
informant is likely to have evidence bearing
on the merits of the case . . . His burden
extends only to a showing that, in view of
the evidence, the informer would be a material
witness on the issue of guilt which might
result in exoneration and that nondisclosure
of his identity would deprive the defendant
of a fair trial.
State v. Tuell, 541 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Ariz. 1975).

In the

present case, appellant has not made any showing as to
how the informant's testimony would have been material to
the issue of appellant's guilt.

In addition, as will be
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more fully developed infra, appellant could easily have
subpoenaed the person he felt was the informant as a
witness if the informant's testimony would have helped
appellant's defense.

As the Supreme Court of Colorado

recently stated:
. the accused is required to
make at least a minimal affirmative
showing of the need for disclosure; and
. . a defendant's mere unsupported
assertion that he desires disclosure is
not enough.
A defendant's speculations,
without more, will not support a conclusion that the informant would be of any
substantial assistance in his defense.
People v. Langford, Colo., 550 P.2d 329 (1976).
State v. Bankhead, 514 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1973).

See also

Appellant alle:-

only that the informant might have assisted in developing a:.
entrapment defense or might have helped establish that the
transaction never occurred.

The entrapment defense was

apparently abandoned by appellant in favor of his defense
that the transaction did not take place.

As to the latter

defense, the informant's testimony would have been merely
cumulative to that offered by the three defense witnesses,
assuming that testimony would be favorable to the defense
all.

o-

Given the animosity between Richard Garrett and

appellant, and the remote possibility that Deputy Whittaker
and Garrett somehow fabricated the charge, it is incredible
that the informer's testimony would have been favorable
to the defense.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the case of People v. Marquez, Colo., 546 P.2d
482

(1976), the Colorado Supreme Court fully analyzed the

post-Roviaro case law and set forth the factors which must
be weighed as part of the Roviaro balancing test.

Those

factors include:
. whether the informant was an
eyewitness and earwitness to the criminal
transaction and whether the informer
himself is available or could, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, be
made available; whether other witnesses
to the transaction are in a position to
testify; the likelihood that-the testimony
of the informer will vary significantly
from that of other available or potentially
available witnesses; whether the defendant
himself knows the identify of the informant or could without undue effort
discover his identify; whether the informant
was deeply or only peripherally involved
in the criminal transaction.
546 P.2d 482, 485.

In Marquez, the court held that since

there was another witness to the alleged sale of heroin
by the appellant who could have been called to support the
defense and since it appeared that appellant knew the identity
of the informant, the public interest outweighed the interest
of the appellant.
Applying the Marquez factors to the instant case,
the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the
appellant's interest in disclosure.

First, it is not clear

whether Richard Garrett was actually an eye-or earwitness to

-11-
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sale transaction between appellant and Deputy Whittaker.
Since appellant denies that any such transaction occurred,
whether the informant was a witness to the transaction or
not, this information would not have helped the defense.
Second, Mr. Garrett was only peripherally involved in the
transaction.

He did not receive the marijuana from

appellant (as was the case in Roviaro) , but merely introduced
Deputy Whittaker to the appellant.

Third, Richard Garrett

was not the only witness besides the appellant who could
"amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses,
Roviaro, supra at 64-65.

As in Marquez, there was another

witness to the transaction, Vickie Forshee, appellant's
ex-wife, who could and did testify in appellant's favor.
This establishes that the necessity of the informant's
availability to the defendant in Roviaro was not present
here.
Fourth, any possible testimony

given by the

informant was not likely to have varied significantly from
the testimony

of Deputy Whittaker.

Such testimony could ha::

have been helpful to appellant's defense.

If Mr. Garrett hac

testified that no transaction took place, his testimony

wou~

have been merely cumulative and thus not substantially
helpful to appellant.

Finally, and most importantly, it

15

clear from the record that appellant in fact knew the
identify of the informant (R. 27, T. 25).

Nevertheless,

~

?

~

1

-
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____________________. . . . . . . .

appellant apparently made no significant effort to locate and/or
subpoena the person he suspected to be the informant to
elicit his testimony.

Appellant's failure to call Richard

Garrett as a witness is inconsistent with his present
argument that Garrett's testimony would have been relevant
and helpful to his defense.
In the recent case of Lopez v. State, 574 S.W. 2d
563 (Tex. Cr. App. 1978), a case factually similar to the
instant one, the court held that although normally disclosure
would be required if the informant played a prominent part
in bringing the offense about or was a material witness, where
the defendant and his counsel know the identity of the
informer and there is no indication that the defendant could
not have produced the informant as a witness or that his
testimony is unavailable, it is not error to refuse to compel
disclosure.
1314

To the same effect is State v. Hull, 487 P.2d

(Mont. 1971).

In light of the factors discussed

immediately above, respondent submits that the Roviaro
balance should be struck in favor of the state's exercise of
the privilege to protect the confidentiality of the informant.
Thus, it was not error for the trial court to permit the
state to withhold the identity of the confidential informant.

-13-
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that appellant has failed
to show that disclosure of the identity of the state's
confidential informant would have been relevant and helpful
to his defense or essential to a fair determination of
the issues of this case.

Thus, appellant's conviction and

sentence should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSFN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARL0\'7
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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